Issues in US-Russia Relations (Part 2/2): A Brief Assessment of the Impediments to Rivalry Termination

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov press a symbolic 'Reset Button' in Geneva, Switzerland on March 6, 2009 in an attempt to symbolically start the US-Russia relationship anew (Image:Wikimedia Commons).

The rivalry between the United States of America and Russia is perhaps the most well documented enduring rivalry on record. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower there were many well reasoned and cautiously optimistic assessments pointing towards a possible termination of rivalry. There have been several bilateral attempts to reach normalization and rapprochement between the two sides since the Russian Federation emerged as the most powerful heir to the Soviet Union, most notably during President Barack Obama's first term when a famousreset button was symbolically pressed on US-Russia relations by the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Sergey Lavrov, the longstanding Foreign Minister of Russia.

However, relations between the two states have been marked with acrimony since the end of the Cold War and the two sides have been on the brink of confrontation on several occasions, including during recent times. Thus although both sides may have attempted to initiate sincere diplomatic processes intended to bring about deeper engagement success in this regard has been elusive and the US-Russia rivalry endures to this day. This study seeks to briefly outline the impediments to US-Russia rivalry termination.

Both Russia and the US have competing interests in Crimea and Syria. Russia supports Russian-speaking rebels in Crimea against the Ukrainian government, which has the backing of the US. And the US supports the so-called 'moderate rebels' in Syria against the Syrian government, which has the backing of Russia. Although the conflicts in Crimea and Syria are entirely different the two states have nevertheless found reason to engage the other in a proxy war which creates an environment of confrontationinstead of cooperation.

In terms of International Relations, the emergence of a common threat is a condition that is known to aid in rivalry termination between states. In this regard the threat of terrorism, which has been looming on the horizon across the globe for far too long, qualifies as a truly global common threat that can create an area of convergence between the two rival states. Recently, many European cities have been struck with terrorist violence and the US, too, has witnessed terror attacks such as those in Boston or San Bernardino. Several European states — such as Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece — have repeatedly called for engaging Russia instead of pursuing a policy that incubates estrangement or hostility. Furthermore, both the US and Russia see terrorism as a common threat and are firmly opposed to terror groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Theoretically the global war against terrorism constitutes an area of convergence which can ideally be used to steer even this acrimonious relationship towards normalization. However, realistically terror as a common threat has not proven to be enough to terminate the US-Russia rivalry. Moreover, both countries have themselves been supporting a different set of non state actors which the other considers as terrorists in Crimea and Syria. The US has repeatedly called for an end to the use of pro-Russian militias in Crimea and Russia considers the US backed 'moderate rebels' in Syria worthy of bombing. The two countries also have contrasting ideas for the future of Crimea and Syria.

Ultimately, the two sides have not been able to create an area of convergence based on the threat of terrorism even though they agree on a number of issues regarding terrorism itself, and this situation may continue well into the future. Thus the rise of global terrorism has failed to bridge the gap between two of the world's greatest military powers, and the possibility of a firmly united front against a common threat — such as one that was witnessed against Nazi Germany during the Second World War — is minimal at best.

Also, the ongoing emergence of a multi-polar world constitutes a change in external environment which may, in theory, create conditions that are conducive for US-Russia engagement. The emergence of multi-polarity in the world order and a recent thaw that some of the American allies — such as Israel, Turkey and Japan — have enjoyed with Russia can theoretically lend strength to any attempts for US-Russia rapprochement instead of a scenario in which there would be dissent within the allied camp. However, each one of the aforementioned countries have managed independent relations with competing powers in the past, and are in no significant way poised or willing to compel either Russia or the US to move towards engagement. Countries such as India have enjoyed excellent relations with both the US and Russia throughout the Twenty First Century without interfering in US-Russia relations, and may see little — if any — incentive to change their neutral approach.

Another condition that can effectively terminate a rivalry is a change in leadership in one or more participants to a rivalry. Such a change will occur in the November of this year in the United States of America as President Barack Obama hands over power to either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump. A Trump presidency may help initiate a thaw in US-Russia relations but not much can be assessed on the tangibles at this point, especially given the rather mercurial and unpredictable nature of Donald Trump as a leader. However, a Hillary Clinton presidency will almost certainly see the veteran stateswoman adopt a more assertive stance towards Russia. In a well-argued article titled 'Why Putin fears a Clinton presidency', Frida Ghitis outlines a number of occasions in which Hillary Clinton had called for stricter measures against Moscow. It can be argued with reasonable certainty that, if elected, she will initiate tougher measures against Russia if President Vladimir Putin does not heed favorably to Washington's concerns.

Furthermore, allegations of Russian interference in the US election campaigns via cyber attacks — carried out ostensibly to harm the Clinton presidential campaign — have caused an unprecedented souring in US-Russia relations. If these allegations are true then this constitutes a serious breach of established inter-state norms where Moscow may be viewed as an outside aggressor interfering in America's sacred culture of democracy by Washington. These grievances may end up causing further tensions between Washington and Moscow.

However, all is not yet lost in the US-Russia equation. A window for rapprochement still exists between the US and Russia even despite recent provocations. The two sides have not engaged each other in a direct military confrontation in either Crimea or Syria, although they have come close to doing so on several occasions. Also, as entrenched as the positions of both sides vis-a-vis each other may be the channels of communications are still open, and both sides routinely use these channels and other platforms to hold talks frequently. Overall, bilateral relations may be tense but they have not reached their lowest point yet.

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Finally, cautious optimism must not give way to skepticism even though there are visible impediments to a process of US-Russia rapprochement. Even a schism as deep and historic as that between the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church can be attempted to be bridged by sincere effort and strong will, and such an attempt was made earlier this year after nearly a millennium by Pope Francis and Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. One hopes that where people of faith have moved forward to bridge an old divide, the statesmen will not be left too far behind in their due efforts to ensure lasting peace.

This article constitutes the second part of a two-part series on US-Russia Relations. The first part is titled Issues in US-Russia Relations (Part 1/2): The Limitations of the 'Isolate Russia' Approach.